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Private Equity Investment in High Growth Companies: Selection & Performance 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the years, private equity buyout funds (PEs) have become increasingly interested in 
investing in high growth entrepreneurial firms, which has traditionally been an investment 
territory of venture capital funds (VCs). There is a dearth of study on how PEs invest and 
perform in the so-called “growth equity” space.  The purpose of this research paper is to 
fill this void in the extant literature by comparing the characteristics of investments by PEs 
to those by VCs in entrepreneurial companies between January 1990 and December 2014. 
My research finds that both investment round size and company valuation are larger when 
PEs are among active round investors. Surprisingly, companies with private equity 
participation are less likely to exit successfully, however they are more likely to exit via 
IPO given successful exit. 
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I. Introduction 
While private equity can take on many different meanings, most often the term is used to 
refer to traditional private equity buyout funds (PEs). Since the onset of the second private equity 
wave in the early 1990s, PEs and VCs have experienced significant growth and played a role of 
increasing importance in the global capital markets. In 1991, new private equity transactions 
were $10 billion but by the beginning of 2006 they had reached $500 billion. In the U.S. alone, 
the number of transactions almost doubled between 2000 and 2005, while the value rose four 
times (Acharya, V. V., Franks, J., & Servaes, H. 2007).  
While both PEs and VCs make investments in companies not traded on a public 
exchange, they differ in their respective investment objectives, styles, and territories. Over the 
years, however, these differences between PE and VC investments have become somewhat 
blurred. One such example is that there has been an increasing interest of PEs in high growth 
entrepreneurial companies, which overlaps with investments that have traditionally been made 
by VCs. Using a sample of investments in entrepreneurial companies made between January 
1990 and December 2014, this paper compares the investment characteristics of PEs and VCs in 
the growth equity space by looking at differences in investment round size and company 
valuation when there is PE participation to when PE participation is non-existent. The second 
part of this paper evaluates investment performance of PEs and VCs by analyzing the probability 
of successful exit, measured through IPO or M&A under the same circumstances. 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Trends in the Growth Equity Market 
 In the last decade, there has been a massive shift from early stage investors and away 
from traditional buyout funds in the private equity industry which has resulted in the emergence 
of growth equity (ACGCapital, 2013). As defined by the National Venture Capital Association, 
growth equity investments are made in companies that have rapidly growing revenues, positive 
cash flow and often have no prior institutional investment. As the investment time horizon for 
venture-backed companies has grown, so too has the need for continued financing of these 
emerging growth companies in the longer run-up to their exits. PEs are increasingly interested in 
investing in these founder-owned private companies with high growth potential (Evans, 2013). 
Since the start of 2008, growth equity investments have totaled $12.4 billion across 616 deals 
with the industry mix being very similar to that of VCs. In 2013, 40% and 5% of growth equity 
deals and funding went to the Internet and healthcare sectors, respectively (CB Insights 2013). 
B. Private Equity vs. Venture Capital Investments 
Traditionally, the types of companies, investment styles, and capital structure of PEs 
investments are very different from those of VCs. For instance, PEs typically invest across all 
industries, almost always buy 100% of later-stage mature companies and use a combination of 
equity and debt in their investments. They also make many fewer, but much larger investments 
than do VCs. Returns by PEs are usually dependent on financial leverage. On the other hand, 
VCs focus on technology companies, acquire a minority stake (less than 50%) in early-stage 
(sometimes pre-revenue) companies and use only equity in their investments. They typically 
5 
 
many more investments and returns are dependent on future revenue growth and profitability of 
the companies in which they invest.  
C. Performance and Preferred Exit Method 
Previous literature has studied the performance of private equity investments by looking 
at the probability of successful exit from these investments. Private equity investments are long 
term in nature and are exited after several years either through an initial public offering, trade 
sale, or secondary sale to other private equity funds. In evaluating the probability of a successful 
exit for private equity investments made between 1980 and 2000, Sarin, Das and Jagannathan 
(2002) find that the probability of exit through an IPO is roughly 20-25% and an exit via 
acquisition to be 10-20%. The probability of successful exit from private equity investments is 
also higher for firms in the high-tech, biotech, and medical sectors. Since that time, Strömberg 
(2008) instead shows an increase in exit of private equity investments through sales to other 
buyout funds, known as secondary buyouts, and a decreased number of exits through IPOs. The 
most common exit route is through trade sales to another corporation, roughly 24% of 
investments are exited through secondary buyouts, and IPOs account for only 13% of exits. In 
the venture capital space, Arif Khursed studies the exit behavior of venture capital firms from 
1990 and 2006 and finds IPO to be the preferred exit route, followed by trade sales and other exit 
routes. Barry (1994) also shows that IPO is the most profitable exit route for venture capital 
companies. 
While the differences between investments traditionally made by PEs and VCs are well-
known, the differences between these investments in the growth equity space have been less 
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studied. This paper will attempt to fill this void and identify some of those differences, with a 
focus on investment size, company valuation, and exit performance. 
III. Hypotheses    
Based on the nature and investment style of buyout funds, it is expected that both 
investment size and company valuations will be higher in investments where PE funds 
participate. These relationships are expected to be even more likely in investments where PE 
funds act as the lead investor. With regards to exit, similar results are expected. PEs participation 
and having a PE as the lead investor is expected to increase the likelihood of successful exit. 
H1N: With PEs participation, investment size and valuations will not be larger than without 
PEs participation. 
H1A: With PEs participation, investment size and valuations will be larger than without PEs 
participation. 
H2N: PEs participation will not increase the likelihood of investment exit, either through IPO 
or trade sales. 
H2A: PEs participation will increase the likelihood of investment exit, either through IPO or 
trade sales. 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
A. Data and Sample 
We obtain data on U.S. private equity and venture capital investments in entrepreneurial 
companies between 1990 and 2014 from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert. The database 
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consists of 285,248 investor round-level observations and includes many characteristics of those 
investments, including investee company name, industry, and stage at investment round, as well 
as other characteristics such as round level, equity investment amount, investor fund name, and 
investor fund type. Exhibits 1-4 summarize characteristics of private equity and venture capital 
investments over the time horizon, and include aggregate equity funding by PEs and VCs, equity 
funding by year, % of funding by company stage, and % of funding by company industry, 
respectively.  
The data also include post-investment characteristics of investee companies, including 
variables that represent exit through IPO or trade sales. Because the focus of this paper is on the 
characteristics of investments by buyout funds in entrepreneurial companies, the first data screen 
eliminates any investment observations made by funds other than those characterized as either 
buyout, general private equity, other private equity, or venture capital. For the analyses we refer 
to the collective group of buyout funds, general private equity funds, and other private equity 
funds as PEs. The second screen on the data is run on fund investor type to include only 
investments made by funds characterized as independent private partnerships. Other fund types 
(e.g. investment banks, fund of funds, endowment, pension, and corporate ventures) are excluded 
to remove any potential effects that investor type may have on the analyses. After screening, the 
population was reduced to 164,683 investor round observations. The investor round observations 
are then consolidated into round level data. During the consolidation process, a new variable, 
With PE, is generated to indicate whether or not a private equity fund participated in that specific 
round of funding. For a given round of funding, the variable is assigned a value of 1 if one or 
more private equity funds participate and a value of 0 if there is no private equity fund 
participation. An additional dummy variable, PE Lead, is also generated and assumes a value of 
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1 if a private equity fund acts as the lead investor or value 0 if there is no private equity 
participation or they are not the lead investor, with the lead being the investor that makes the 
largest investment in the round. After running the above mentioned screens and consolidating the 
data to the round level, 76,465 total investment rounds remain which will be used in the 
analyses. The final sample includes 29,752 investee companies, of which 1,283 successfully 
exited through IPO and 5,245 exited successfully through trade sales. 
B. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the 76,465 financing rounds and compares key 
characteristics of rounds when there is PE participation to rounds when there is no PE 
participation. Of the total financing rounds, 10,544 rounds include PE participation and 6,469 are 
led by a PE. This relates to the financing of 6,598 investee companies. A greater percentage of 
financing rounds with PE participation occur at the expansion (47.3%) and later stage (22.3%) 
than without PE participation. With regards to industry, more financing rounds occur in 
companies operating in the non-high technology industry (23.4%), compared to only 12.7% 
when there is no PE participation. Average round size and the average number of investors in a 
given round are each larger when PEs participate. Investments are also more geographically 
diverse, with approximately 67.3% of investment rounds occurring in firms located outside of 
California.   
C. Regression Analysis 
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
In analyzing round size and company valuations of PE investments, four linear 
regressions are run at the investment round level. Variables are described in Appendix A. In the 
9 
 
linear regressions, Ln (Round Size) and Ln (Valuation) are the dependent variables and With PE 
is the independent variable of interest. In addition to controlling for company stage, company 
industry, the number of investors, and the investment year, the regressions are also run with PE 
Lead as the independent variable to test for robustness. 
 
 
 
 
In Table 2, Panel A shows the results of regressions 1 and 2 and Panel B shows the results of 
regressions 3 and 4. The correlation coefficients of PE participation with round size and 
company valuation are .4595 and .2666, respectively and significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients of PE as the lead investor to round size and company valuation are .5584 and .3289, 
respectively and again statistically significant. The results are also economically significant. On 
average, round size is approximately $1.58 million and $1.75 million larger with PE participation 
and when PE leads, respectively. Also, average company valuation is approximately $1.31 
million larger with PE participation and $1.39 million larger when a PE leads the round. 
Probit Regressions 
To analyze the performance of PE investments, four probit regressions are run. Similar to the 
linear regressions above, With PE and PE Lead are the independent variables of interest. 
 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (1) 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (2) 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (3) 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (4)  
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (5) 
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Tables 3 shows the results of the probit regressions on successful company exit and IPO. Panel A 
shows the results of regressions 5 and 6 and Panel B shows the results of regressions 7 and 8. 
With regards to exit performance, we surprisingly see a significant negative correlation of -.1356 
between successful exit and PEs participation. However, while a negative correlation of -.1127 is 
observed when a private equity fund leads a given round, correlation is not as strong. These 
results are opposite of the expected outcome, and companies are actually less likely to exit when 
a private equity fund participates. However, when looking at successful exits, slight positive 
correlations exist between exiting through IPO and private equity fund participation and PE as 
the lead investor. The corresponding coefficients in these two analyses are .1031 and .0666. 
Companies are more likely to exit via IPO than trade sales when there is PE participation or 
when a PE leads the investment round. Recall the sample includes 29,752 companies, of which 
6,528 exited successfully. Approximately 80.3% of these exits occur through trade sales, with 
the remaining companies exiting through IPO, consistent with Strömberg’s (2008) post-2000 exit 
conclusions, that more PEs exit through trade sales and secondary buyouts as opposed to IPO.  
V. Conclusion 
While PEs have historically had very different investment strategies and styles from VCs, 
recent trends show that more and more PEs are becoming interested in investing in 
entrepreneurial companies. While past literature has studied the differences in investments by 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (6) 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (7) 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 =  ∝  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 +  𝛽2 ∗  Control Variables (8) 
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private equity buyout funds and venture capital funds separately, little academic research has 
been done on private equity investments in the growth equity space. This paper shows some 
characteristics of PE investments, as well as their performance, in what has traditionally been VC 
territory. 
 This paper analyzes 76,465 private equity and venture capital investment rounds in 
entrepreneurial companies between 1990 and 2014 and shows that investment round size as well 
as company valuation at the time of the investment are positively correlated with PE 
participation. These relationships are even stronger when the PE fund that participates acts as the 
lead investor. With regards to exit, the sample shows that the probability of exiting through 
either IPO or trade sales is approximately 21.9% which is fairly consistent with previous 
literature. However, the paper finds that while successful exit is less likely when a PE 
participates or leads, companies are more likely to exit through IPO, as opposed to trade sales, 
when PE participation is present. A possible explanation for this may be the higher company 
valuation with active PE participation, therefore reducing the feasibility of a potential trade sale, 
and forcing the company to go public in order to achieve the higher valuation. 
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Exhibits 1-4: PE Investments in High Growth Companies 
 
Exhibits 1-4 show trends of PE investments in high growth companies over the data sample 
period (1990-2014). Exhibits include aggregate equity funding, number of investee companies, 
time series of funding by year, and percent of funding by company stage and industry. 
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Table 1 – Sample Characteristics of Private Equity Investments from 1990 to 2014 
Our sample consists of 76,465 financing rounds in high growth companies made by private 
equity funds and venture capital funds between 1990 and 2014. The table compares all financing 
rounds that include PE participation to rounds in which there is no PE participation. Investment 
characteristics include the number of investee companies, company stage, company industry, 
average investment round size, average number of investors, and exits through IPO and trade 
sales. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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Table 2 – Round Size and Valuation: With PE Participation vs. Without PE Participation 
This table shows the results pertaining to round size and company valuation in financing rounds 
with PEs participation. Panel A describes regressions 1 & 2 where With PE acts as the 
independent variable, and Panel B describes regressions 3 & 4 where PE Lead acts as the 
independent variable. Regressions with Ln (Valuation) as dependent variable exclude 
observations in which company valuation data was unavailable. In each specification we control 
for company stage, company industry, number of investors, and investment year. Variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix A. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and 
*** at 1%. 
 
 
17 
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Table 3 – Company Successful: With PE Participation vs. Without PE Participation 
This table shows probit regressions pertaining to company exits when PEs participate. Panel A 
describes regressions 5 & 6 where With PE acts as the independent variable, and Panel B 
describes regressions 7 & 8 where PE Lead acts as the independent variable. In each 
specification we control for company stage, company industry, number of investors, and 
investment year. Also added is variable PE-VC Syndication. Variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
